Research Evidence on the Impact of Work Requirements in Need-Tested Programs by Falk, Gene
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
9-20-2018 
Research Evidence on the Impact of Work Requirements in Need-
Tested Programs 
Gene Falk 
Congressional Research Service 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. 
For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Research Evidence on the Impact of Work Requirements in Need-Tested 
Programs 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] Congress is again debating work requirements for programs providing need-tested assistance to 
low-income families and individuals. Need-tested programs provide benefits and services to individuals 
and families based on financial need (usually low income). This is in contrast to social insurance 
programs such as Social Security and Unemployment Insurance, which base their benefits on past work. 
Work requirements for cash assistance for parents in needy families with children receiving public 
benefits have been part of policy debates since the 1960s. Those debates culminated in the 1996 welfare 
reform law (P.L. 104-193), which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant 
to replace the pre-1996 cash assistance program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
Since the enactment of the 1996 law, extending work requirements to other need-tested programs has 
sometimes been raised in policy debates about need-tested programs. Legislation before the 115th 
Congress—the House-passed version of H.R. 2—would expand work requirements in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Programs (SNAP). H.R. 5861, reported to the House from the Ways and Means 
Committee, would alter some of TANF’s rules regarding work. In addition, the Trump Administration is 
currently granting demonstration waivers for states to implement work requirements for certain recipients 
of Medicaid, and has proposed expanded work requirements for housing assistance programs. 
Work requirements for recipients of government assistance seek to achieve a variety of policy goals. They 
can attempt to offset work disincentives in government assistance programs and promote a culture of 
work over dependency on government benefits. Work requirements can also reduce the assistance 
caseloads, leading to government savings. They can screen out those who decide that the benefit of 
receiving assistance is not worth the cost of complying with a work requirement. They can also be used 
to remove from the assistance programs those who do not comply with the societal norm of work.1 In 
general, the economic status of most individuals is tied to work—either current work, past work, or the 
work of another family member. Thus, requiring work can be seen as a means of improving the economic 
status of individuals and families, as it is the primary means of lifting them out of poverty. 
What does the research evidence indicate about the impact of work requirements in meeting these policy 
goals? Most of the research that addresses this issue comes from a set of experiments, conducted prior 
to the 1996 welfare reform, on alternative approaches to the work and education provisions in TANF’s 
predecessor program, AFDC. This report summarizes the findings from the pre-1996 welfare-to-work 
experiments as well as the limits of applying those findings to the current policy debate around work 
requirements. 
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Research Evidence on the Impact of Work 
Requirements in Need-Tested Programs 
Congress is debating work requirements for recipients in programs providing need-tested 
assistance to low-income families and individuals. Legislation before the 115th Congress—the 
House-passed version of H.R. 2—would expand work requirements in the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). H.R. 5861, reported to the House from the Ways and 
Means Committee, would alter some of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program’s rules regarding work. In addition, the Trump Administration is currently granting 
demonstration waivers for states to implement work requirements for certain recipients of 
Medicaid, and it has proposed expanded work requirements for tenants in assisted housing.  
Work requirements for recipients of government assistance seek to achieve a variety of policy goals, including promoting 
work, reducing assistance caseloads, and improving the economic status of individuals and families. What does the research 
evidence indicate about the impact of work requirements? The impact of a policy is the difference it makes. Most of the 
research that addresses work requirements and need-tested assistance comes from a set of experiments, conducted prior to the 
1996 welfare reform law, on alternative approaches to the work and education provisions in TANF’s predecessor program, 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  
The pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments provided evidence that, for mostly nonworking single mothers, work 
requirements combined with employment and education services could increase employment, increase wages, and reduce 
assistance payments. Such programs—without supplementing earnings—did not raise incomes. A subset of experiments on 
programs that combined work requirements, employment and education services, and continued earnings supplements found 
that some programs increased incomes, but when they did, they did not reduce the amount of government assistance provided 
to the family.  
However, the findings from the pre-1996 experiments cannot be automatically applied to TANF. TANF was implemented 
differently than the pre-1996 experiments.  
As Congress debates work requirements in SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance, there is no large accumulated research 
base to draw from that applies to these three programs. Given the differences in populations, presence of those in the 
programs who are already working, goals, and funding structures for employment and education services, the findings of the 
pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments cannot be directly applied to the current debate.  
 Different populations. These three programs serve a broader population (including men, single persons, 
and childless couples) than did the evaluated pre-1996 experiments (mostly non-working single mothers), 
with potentially different challenges.  
 Different goals. SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance include populations that are already working. 
Applying work requirements to recipients who are working implies different policy goals than that of 
moving non-working recipients into work. The goal of the Medicaid waivers that include work 
requirements is to improve the health status of recipients, a different purpose, with different outcomes, than 
the goals tested in the pre-1996 experiments. 
 Different approaches to employment and education services. The pre-1996 experiments were of 
mandatory welfare–to-work programs, which combined a participation requirement with a program that 
funded employment or education services. Among the SNAP, Medicaid, and housing programs, only 
SNAP has an employment and training program.  
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Introduction 
Congress is again debating work requirements for programs providing need-tested assistance to 
low-income families and individuals. Need-tested programs provide benefits and services to 
individuals and families based on financial need (usually low income). This is in contrast to social 
insurance programs such as Social Security and Unemployment Insurance, which base their 
benefits on past work. 
Work requirements for cash assistance for parents in needy families with children receiving 
public benefits have been part of policy debates since the 1960s. Those debates culminated in the 
1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193), which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) block grant to replace the pre-1996 cash assistance program of Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC). Since the enactment of the 1996 law, extending work 
requirements to other need-tested programs has sometimes been raised in policy debates about 
need-tested programs. Legislation before the 115th Congress—the House-passed version of H.R. 
2—would expand work requirements in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programs 
(SNAP). H.R. 5861, reported to the House from the Ways and Means Committee, would alter 
some of TANF’s rules regarding work. In addition, the Trump Administration is currently 
granting demonstration waivers for states to implement work requirements for certain recipients 
of Medicaid, and has proposed expanded work requirements for housing assistance programs.  
Work requirements for recipients of government assistance seek to achieve a variety of policy 
goals. They can attempt to offset work disincentives in government assistance programs and 
promote a culture of work over dependency on government benefits. Work requirements can also 
reduce the assistance caseloads, leading to government savings. They can screen out those who 
decide that the benefit of receiving assistance is not worth the cost of complying with a work 
requirement. They can also be used to remove from the assistance programs those who do not 
comply with the societal norm of work.1 In general, the economic status of most individuals is 
tied to work—either current work, past work, or the work of another family member.2 Thus, 
requiring work can be seen as a means of improving the economic status of individuals and 
families, as it is the primary means of lifting them out of poverty. 
What does the research evidence indicate about the impact of work requirements in meeting these 
policy goals? Most of the research that addresses this issue comes from a set of experiments, 
conducted prior to the 1996 welfare reform, on alternative approaches to the work and education 
provisions in TANF’s predecessor program, AFDC. This report summarizes the findings from the 
pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments as well as the limits of applying those findings to the 
current policy debate around work requirements. 
The Pre-1996 Welfare-to-Work Experiments 
Before the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193), a large number of experiments were fielded to inform the 
welfare reform debates that spanned four decades, from the 1960s to the mid-1990s.3 The 
                                                 
1 See CRS Report R43400, Work Requirements, Time Limits, and Work Incentives in TANF, SNAP, and Housing 
Assistance. 
2 See CRS In Focus IF10562, Poverty and Economic Opportunity. 
3 For a brief overview of the welfare reform debates from the 1960s through the mid-1990s, see CRS Report R44668, 
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Legislative History. 
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experiments were demonstrations of alternative policies and were evaluated using the randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) method, which is used to isolate the effect of differing policies from other 
factors that can influence outcomes. 
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) 
An assessment of a welfare-to-work program usually focuses on outcomes, such as the rate at which individuals 
find work, their earnings, whether they leave assistance rolls, and whether they save the federal and state 
governments money through reduced assistance payments. While observing these outcomes conveys important 
information, it does not directly measure the impact of a policy—the difference the program makes—in recipients 
achieving the outcomes. Many factors affect employment, earnings, and benefit receipt of individuals beside the 
effectiveness of a welfare-to-work requirement and an employment and education program. Recipients are likely 
to eventually find employment on their own, even without a program. The context in which a program operates—
the health of the national and local economy; the occupational structure of the area studied; and the 
characteristics of the caseload such as age, educational attainment, and past work experience—can affect the rate 
at which recipients find work and their wages. Program rules other than the work requirement also affect whether 
recipients who find work leave the program. 
The evaluations discussed in this section of this report were conducted using the randomized control trial (RCT) 
method, which is used to isolate the impact of different policies on outcomes. RCTs randomly assigned AFDC 
recipients in a site to treatment groups (those subject to requirements and provided services) and a control group 
(those not subject to requirements and services). If a sufficiently large number of people is randomly assigned to 
two or more groups, statistical theory holds that the characteristics of the people in these groups will be identical. 
Additionally, the random assignment to groups in the same place at the same time ensures that all groups are 
exposed to the same context in terms of economic conditions.  
There are several potential limitations for applying the results of RCTs to understanding the impact of work 
requirements on recipients of need-tested assistance. One limitation is that the RCTs studied the population 
already receiving assistance: they did not measure the impact that a work requirement might have in the rate at 
which individuals come onto the assistance rolls. A second potential limitation is that a study’s findings might hold 
for a given time, place, population, and context, but may not be generalizable beyond that. (This limitation is not 
limited to studies that use the RCT method.)  This was less of a concern in the past when looking at programs 
related to AFDC because the main findings discussed in this section were replicated in many different locations. 
However, it is a potential limitation when looking at different populations, such as those in SNAP, Medicaid, and 
housing assistance programs. That these studies were generally conducted in the early 1990s raises the question of 
whether they are generalizable today, even to the TANF population, given that the economic and program 
context has changed over the past two decades. 
The era of experimentation on alternative welfare policies began with the negative income tax 
(NIT) experiments initiated in the 1960s and 1970s. They were conducted because the welfare 
reforms offered (but never enacted) by Presidents Nixon and Carter were based on the NIT 
model, which was an income guarantee and a gradual “taxing back” of benefits as incomes 
increased.4 In the 1980s, the focus of the experimental research shifted to examining programs 
that required work and/or provided employment services with the goal of moving recipients from 
non-work on the AFDC assistance rolls to work and being off the rolls.5 This research culminated 
in evaluations fielded in the early 1990s in the federally sponsored National Evaluation of 
Welfare to Work Strategies (NEWWS) study; evaluations required of states that obtained 
“waivers” of AFDC requirements related to work; and the Minnesota Family Investment Program 
(MFIP), which required special legislative authorization. 
                                                 
4 The findings from the negative income tax experiments are summarized in Lessons from the Income Maintenance 
Experiments. Proceedings from a Conference Held in September 1986, ed. Alicia H. Munnell (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1987). 
5 The history of this research is summarized in Judith M. Gueron and Howard Rolston, Fighting for Reliable Evidence 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013). 
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Mandatory Welfare-to-Work Programs 
This report focuses on findings from mandatory welfare-to-work programs. These programs 
combined work requirements with a program that provided funded employment and educational 
services. Recipients were assigned to activities such as job search or required to enroll and make 
progress in educational activities, and they were sanctioned if they did not participate as required. 
Some of these programs included independent job search—requiring recipients to look for 
employment on their own—but also included other activities if that independent job search did 
not result in employment. The sanction for not participating in required activities in most of the 
evaluated programs was a reduction—not a termination—of a family’s benefit. 
The evaluations of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments, taken as a combined body of 
research, provided a fairly consistent set of findings. This report uses findings from NEWWS to 
illustrate the impact of mandatory welfare-to-work programs. The NEWWS findings were 
consistent with a large number of evaluations—fielded at different times in different sites—from 
the 1980s through the mid-1990s.6  In addition, this report examines a second set of evaluations 
of mandatory welfare-to-work programs that also provided “earnings supplements,” which 
continued benefits for those who found work while on the rolls. 
The studies discussed here were initiated before 1996. However, many of the evaluations were 
not published until well after the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law. The law permitted 
welfare-to-work experiments that were initiated prior to its enactment to continue after 
enactment, up to the date of the experiment’s scheduled expiration. 
Impact of Programs on Employment, Earnings, and 
Assistance Receipt 
Mandatory welfare-to-work programs often increased rates of employment and average earnings 
above what was observed in the absence of such programs. The positive impact on employment 
and earnings was usually modest in size. Some evaluations found that the employment and 
earnings impacts faded with time, so that the main effect of such programs was to accelerate entry 
into the workforce.  
Mandatory welfare-to-work programs often resulted in lower rates of receipt of assistance 
(usually measured for both cash and food assistance) and lower assistance payments, on average. 
Additionally, while employment and earnings impacts sometimes faded over time, the reductions 
in assistance payments tended to persist as a long-term impact. Lower levels of assistance 
payments stemmed from both fewer recipients on the rolls and lower benefit payments as 
recipients worked and had earned income (though, under AFDC rules, the time period over which 
a recipient could have substantial earnings and remain on the rolls was limited). Additionally, 
some of the reduced assistance payments resulted from sanctions on families that did not comply 
with the participation requirement.  
The NEWWS evaluation was designed to provide evidence on whether a “work-first” approach 
or an “education-focused” approach yielded larger impacts.7 The work-first approach generally 
                                                 
6 This section focuses on research fielded in the 1990s. For a discussion of earlier research on welfare-to-work 
programs, see Judith M. Gueron and Edward Pauly, From Welfare to Work (New York: Russell Sage, 1991); and 
Daniel Friedlander and Gary Burtless, Five Years After. The Long-Term Effects of Welfare-to-Work Programs (New 
York: Russell Sage, 1995).  
7 Gayle Hamilton, Stephen Freedman, and Lisa Gennetian, et al., National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. 
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assigned recipients to job search as their first activity. At three NEWWS sites discussed here 
(Atlanta; Grand Rapids, MI; Riverside, CA), job search was conducted in the context of a “job 
club,” which included classroom instruction as well as structured and supervised contacts with 
employers. The education-focused approach assigned those without a high school diploma to 
basic education activities first, and those with high school diplomas to vocational education or 
other skills-building activities. NEWWS tested both approaches head-to-head in the same 
location, at the same time, and with the same population.  
The basic finding from NEWWS is that both approaches increased employment and reduced 
assistance payments. The impacts from the work-first approach occurred quickly. For example, 
the Riverside work-first program (the findings shown here were restricted to those without a high 
school diploma) had the largest immediate impacts, with the employment rate for the treatment 
group exceeding that of the control group by almost 17 percentage points. The employment 
impacts for all programs declined over time, as members of the control group became more likely 
to be employed in later years. The cash assistance impacts also tended to fade—again because 
members of the control group also left assistance over time. However, many programs—work 
first or education focused—had lasting impacts on both rates of employment and receipt of cash 
assistance through year five after random assignment. All lasting impacts of the programs, except 
for both programs in Grand Rapids, can be considered positive for a welfare-to-work program 
(higher rates of employment, lower rates of benefit receipt). 
A NEWWS program in Portland, OR, operated a “mixed strategy.” Case managers in that 
program had the discretion to offer preparation for a General Educational Development (GED, or 
high school equivalent) credential to those they believed had a good chance of obtaining it. The 
program also allowed participants to forgo low-paying jobs to look and wait for higher-paying 
jobs. Of all the NEWWS programs, Portland’s produced some of the largest employment impacts. 
However, its mixed strategy was not tested head-to-head against a pure work-first or education-
focused strategy, so it is not known whether the large impacts resulted from the program’s 
strategy or from the particular economic context of Portland at that time. 
Figure 1 shows NEWWS findings on employment and cash assistance receipt impacts for years 
one through five following random assignment. The figure shows the impacts (the difference the 
program made) in the employment rate and cash receipt rate for both the work-first and 
education-focused programs in Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside, as well as the program in 
Portland.  
                                                 
How Effective Are Different Welfare-to-Work Approaches? Five-Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven Programs, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education, Washington, DC, December 2001. 
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Figure 1. NEWWS Impacts on Employment Rates and the  
Cash Recipiency Rate, By Year After Random Assignment 
Work-First and Education-Focused Programs in Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside;  
and the Portland Program  
(Year represents year after random assignment) 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on NEWWS evaluation findings. Gayle Hamilton, Stephen 
Freedman, and Lisa Gennetian, et al., National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies. How Effective Are Different 
Welfare-to-Work Approaches? Five-Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven Programs, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services and U.S. Department of Education, Washington, DC, December 2001. 
Notes: An impact was not statistically significant if, given the sample size of the study, it is not possible to be 
90% confident that the impact was different from zero. Random assignment occurred in Atlanta from January 
1992 to June 1993; in Grand Rapids from September 1991 to January 1994; in Riverside from June 1991 to June 
1993; and in Portland from February 1993 to December 1994. 
 
Impacts on Income 
The welfare-to-work experiments of the late 1980s and early 1990s provided evidence that 
mandatory welfare-to-work programs by themselves did not increase total income (i.e., the sum 
of earnings and government assistance). On average, earnings tended to be low; thus, they offset, 
but did not exceed, the reduction in assistance. Typically, the impact on average incomes was not 
statistically different from $0. Even the Portland and Riverside NEWWS programs, which had 
relatively large employment impacts, did not increase incomes on average over the five years. 
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However, a group of evaluations were conducted on programs that provided “earnings 
supplements” (i.e., continued benefits to families in cases where the parent found a job and would 
have become ineligible for AFDC under its regular rules). MFIP had an explicit goal of increasing 
work, reducing dependence, and reducing poverty. MFIP participants who went to work could 
continue to receive assistance from the program at higher earnings levels and for longer periods 
of time than was permitted under AFDC at that time. The MFIP evaluation found that the 
program increased employment and earnings and increased incomes. However, it did not reduce 
receipt of assistance.8 Other programs that combined work requirements with earnings 
supplements—under waivers of AFDC’s rules that restricted benefits for families with earnings—
were conducted in Connecticut, Florida, Vermont, and Virginia. All of these programs had 
positive employment impacts. They also increased incomes during some periods after entry into 
the program; in the case of Connecticut, the time periods when incomes were increased related to 
the structure of the program (e.g., before the imposition of its 21-month time limit on benefit 
receipt).9 The statistically significant income impacts for Florida’s, Vermont’s, and Virginia’s 
programs were less systematic.  
However, the studies also illustrated a policy tradeoff. MFIP continued aid for working families. 
The Connecticut program continued aid for working families before the time limit. Both 
programs increased incomes. MFIP did not reduce assistance payments, and the Connecticut 
program did not reduce assistance payments before the time limit. Additionally, in both of these 
evaluations, the income increase had faded by the end of the evaluation, typically when few 
participants were on the assistance rolls.10  
Table 1 summarizes the findings of these evaluations, showing the change in income from 
earnings, cash assistance, and food benefits. Some evaluations reported these dollar amounts 
differently (e.g., quarterly rather than annually) and Vermont and Virginia calculated total income 
as being different from the sum of the changes in earnings, cash, and food benefits.  
                                                 
8 Cynthia Miller, Virginia Knox, and Lisa A. Gennetian, et al., MFIP Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final 
Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program. Volume 1: Effects on Adults, MDRC, September 2000. 
9 Some NEWWS programs also increased total incomes in some periods, though none increased average incomes over 
the five-year period that was evaluated in that study. NEWWS programs did not supplement earnings, nor did they 
have time limits. The periods when NEWWS programs showed increased incomes or did not increase incomes could 
not be attributed to the structure of the programs.  
10 Susan Scrivener, Richard Hendra, and Cindy Redcross, WRP. Final Report on Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring 
Project, MDRC, September 2002; and Anne Gordon and Susanne James-Burdumy, Impacts of the Virginia Initiative 
for Employment Not Welfare, Mathematica Policy Research Inc., January 2002. 
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Table 1. Impacts on Total Income of Selected Welfare-to-Work Programs that 
Expanded Assistance to Working Families 
(Increases in income that are statistically different from $0 are shown in bold, insignificant differences are 
in italics; year is the year after random assignment) 
    Change in Total Income  
 
Period Covered 
Change in 
Earnings 
Change in 
Cash and Food 
Assistance 
Payments Dollars Percentage 
MFIP (all single parents, 
random assignment from 
4/1994 to 3/1996 ) 
Quarterly 
Average, Year 1 
$25 $230 $255 11.2% 
 
Quarterly 
Average, Year 4 
122 97 219 8.2 
 
Quarterly 
Average, Year 6 
39 34 72 2.3 
Connecticut JOBS First 
(random assignment 
from 1/1996 to 12/1997) 
Annual Average, 
Years 1-2 
419 722 1,140 11.6 
 
Annual Average, 
Years 3-4 
490 -456 34 0.3 
Florida (Escambia 
County, random 
assignment from 5/1994 
to 10/1996) 
Annual Average, 
Year 1 
240 -172 67 1.0 
 
Annual Average, 
Year 3 
910 -414 496 8.1 
 
Annual Average, 
Year 4 
567 -314 253 4.0 
Vermont (random 
assignment from 7/1994 
to 12/1996)a 
Annual Average, 
Years 1-2 
177 -110 117 1.2 
 
Annual Average, 
Years 3-4 
713 -373 442 4.4 
 
Annual Average, 
Years 5-6 
634 -489 206 2.0 
Virginia (random 
assignment from 7/1995 
to 8/1997)b 
Quarter 1 28 -25 -52 -2.4 
 
Quarter 5 110 -18 176 8.3 
 
Quarter 14 145 -5 54 1.9 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) summary of findings of final evaluation reports of the selected 
welfare-to-work experiments. See Lisa A. Gennetian, Cynthia Miller, and Jared Smith, MFIP: Turning Welfare into a 
Work Support. Six Year Impacts on Parents and Children from the Minnesota Family Investment Program, Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), July 2005; Dan Bloom, Susan Scrivener, and Charles 
Michalopoulos, et al., Jobs First. Final Report on Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative, MDRC, February 2002; Dan 
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Bloom, James J. Kemple, and Pamela Morris, et al., The Family Transition Program: Final Report on Florida’s Initial 
Time-Limited Welfare Program, MDRC, December 2000; Susan Scrivener, Richard Hendra, and Cindy Redcross, 
WRP. Final Report on Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project, MDRC, September 2002; and Anne Gordon and 
Susanne James-Burdumy, Impacts of the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare, Mathematica Policy Research 
Inc., January 2002. 
 
a. Total income includes the effect of taxes, so it does not represent the sum of the earnings and assistance 
change.  
b. Total income includes the effect on child support income, so it does not represent the sum of the earnings 
and cash and food assistance changes.  
In addition to the positive employment and income impacts, some of the evaluated programs that 
provided earnings supplements also improved measured outcomes for children, particularly 
school achievement. Note that programs that did not supplement earnings—such as NEWWS—
had no systematic impacts on outcomes for children.11 Mandatory welfare-to-work programs, 
whether accompanied by earnings supplements or not, had negative effects on outcomes such as 
school achievement for adolescents.12  
The Impact of TANF Was Not Experimentally 
Evaluated 
After the 1996 welfare reform law, mandatory welfare-to-work programs were no longer 
considered experiments, they were considered to be the policy. Thus, TANF was never 
evaluated.13  
Differences in TANF from Piloted Programs 
TANF differed from the piloted programs evaluated before 1996 in a number of ways that limit 
the automatic application of the findings from those experiments to TANF. There were differences 
in program rules, performance measurement, and incentives to reduce the caseload. 
Different Program Rules 
The pre-1996 program exempted single mothers with children under the age of 3, though a 
number of the evaluated programs required participation for mothers with children as young as 1 
year old. Under TANF, states determine exemptions from the work requirements, including 
exemptions for mothers with young children. Some states exempt mothers of newborn children 
for as little as three months, with many others exempting only mothers with children under the 
age of 1.14  
                                                 
11 For a synthesis of studies that examined both the impact of welfare-to-work programs on adults and on child 
outcomes, see Pamela Morris, Aletha C. Huston, and Greg J. Duncan, et al., How Welfare and Work Policies Affect 
Children: A Synthesis of Research, MDRC, March 2001. 
12 Lisa A. Gennetian, Greg J. Duncan, and Virginia W. Knox, How Welfare and Work Policies for Parents Affect 
Adolescents. A Synthesis of the Research, MDRC, May 2002. 
13 Assessments of mandatory work requirements in state TANF programs, other than those continued under pre-1996 
waivers, were not evaluated through RCTs. Welfare-related experiments focused on issues such as employment 
retention and advancement, serving particularly hard-to-serve populations, and specific types of interventions (e.g., 
subsidized employment, and career pathways educational and work programs). 
14 See Linda Giannarelli, Christine Heffernan, and Sarah Minton et al., Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies 
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In most evaluated pre-1996 programs, the sanction for not complying with work requirements 
was a reduction in the family’s cash benefit, not termination of the benefit for the whole family. 
Under TANF, states determine the sanction for a family that does not comply with work 
requirements, with most states ultimately ending benefits for the whole family.  
A Performance System that Emphasizes Monthly Rates of Work or 
Participation in Activities, Not Impacts or Outcomes. 
TANF gave states flexibility to design their programs, but it established a performance system to 
assess them that requires states to meet a minimum work participation rate (WPR), set statutorily 
at 50% for all families and 90% for two-parent families (though, as discussed below, these 
percentages are reduced if a state reduces its caseload). States that do not meet their minimum 
WPR risk a reduction in their federal funding. There are detailed rules for what types of 
participation count toward meeting the minimum percentages. Employment while being on the 
benefit rolls counts as participation. The two most common types of participation in welfare-to-
work activities are time limited: job search and readiness is limited to 12 weeks in a 12-month 
period, vocational educational training is limited to 12 months in a recipient’s lifetime. 
Participation in a General Educational Development (GED) program for recipients without a high 
school degree does not count in many circumstances. WPR also measures participation based on 
a minimum number of hours per week for each month on the rolls. The evaluated studies reported 
on whether the mandatory welfare-to-work programs increased participation in activities over 
longer periods of time. 
The 50% and 90% thresholds were not informed by the findings of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work 
experiments—that is, they are not based on evidence from these programs. The 50% and 90% 
requirements implied higher rates of monthly participation than were achieved in the evaluated 
pre-1996 programs, even those that reported relatively large employment impacts. 15 
TANF Has Incentives for States to Seek to Reduce the Caseload 
The AFDC program provided unlimited matching grants to states to cover a part of the cost of 
providing assistance to needy families. TANF is a block grant. The fact that the block grant 
provides states with a set amount of money that does not depend on the number of families who 
receive assistance provides one incentive to reduce the caseload. States can use the “savings” 
from caseload reduction for other purposes, and must bear the cost of increased caseloads.  
Additionally, the minimum WPR can be either fully or partially met through caseload reduction 
because states receive credit against the minimum standards (50% or 90%) they must meet when 
they reduce their caseloads. 
Caseload Reduction and Work Participation Under TANF 
The two most defining characteristics of cash assistance for needy families in the post-1996 
period have been caseload reduction and states technically meeting their minimum WPR, but 
often in ways other than engaging non-employed recipients in activities. In FY1995, a monthly 
average of 4.9 million families received AFDC cash assistance. In FY2017, a monthly average of 
                                                 
as of July 2016, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, 
Administration for Children and Families, OPRE Report 2017-82, October 2017, pp. 131-133. 
15 See Gayle Hamilton and Susan Scrivener, Promoting Participation. How to Increase Involvement in Welfare-to-
Work Activities, MDRC, ReWORKing Welfare, Technical Assistance for States and Localities, September 1999. 
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1.4 million families received TANF assistance. In the early years of TANF, before FY2000, 
caseload reduction was accompanied by reductions in child poverty and increases in work among 
single mothers. However, since 2000 caseloads have generally continued to decline (except for a 
brief increase associated with the 2007 to 2009 recession), even in periods when child poverty 
and the number of families who met TANF financial eligibility rules increased.16 
Under TANF, most states have met their minimum WPR standards through either caseload 
reduction or assisting families with earnings. In FY2016, less than one-fourth of non-employed 
adult recipients were reported by states as engaged in welfare-to-work activities, a proportion that 
is similar to most years of TANF (over the FY2002-FY2016 period, the highest percentage of 
non-employed individuals reported as engaged in activities was 27%).17 
The results of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments should not be confused with the impact 
of TANF. The experience of TANF after 1996 illustrates how policies that were evaluated in 
piloted experiments could differ from those actually implemented in an ongoing program. TANF 
itself has not been evaluated using methods similar to those used in the pre-1996 experiments. 
 
Work Requirements for SNAP, Medicaid, 
and Housing Assistance 
Much of the current focus of the discussions on work requirements is on the SNAP, Medicaid, 
and housing assistance programs. Existing SNAP law has participation requirements and includes 
an Employment and Training (E&T) program. It also time limits non-disabled adult recipients 
without children who are aged 18 to 49 and not working or participating in training to 3 months in 
a 36-month period.18 H.R. 2, as it passed the House, would alter those rules, establishing 
mandatory participation requirements for both those subject to the current time limit as well as 
other non-disabled adults under the age of 60.19 
Medicaid has no statutory work requirements. However, the Trump Administration is currently 
granting research and demonstration waivers to states to permit them to require work and 
“community engagement” for Medicaid recipients. Under statute, these waivers must promote the 
objective of Medicaid, and thus must have a goal of improving health outcomes. As waivers, 
rather than program rules, they may differ in the population covered, the work requirements 
tested, and other provisions (e.g., coverage of health-related services such as enhanced dental and 
                                                 
16 See CRS In Focus IF10889, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: The Decline in the Cash Assistance 
Caseload. 
17 See CRS In Focus IF10856, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Work Requirements. 
18 This is known as the ABAWD (able-bodied adults without dependents) rule. The ABAWD rule is sometimes called a 
work requirement. However, it differs substantially from the evaluated pre-1996 welfare-to-work programs in that 
states are not required to provide employment and educational services to help recipients meet their requirements. 
Recipients subject to the ABAWD rule might be expected to find work on their own within the three-month period, or 
access employment services or educational activities available in their community. States that “pledge” to serve all 
those subject to this rule with employment and training services may receive extra federal funding; in FY2018, there 
were seven such states.  
19 See CRS Report R45197, The House Agriculture Committee’s 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison 
with Current Law. 
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vision benefits, cost sharing). Generally, waivers may be granted to require engagement of non-
elderly, non-pregnant individuals who are not disabled. 20  
In the housing assistance programs, a community service or self-sufficiency activity requirement 
applies to recipients in public housing. Nonexempt public housing residents must participate at 
least eight hours per month in community service or another activity. For Section 8 housing 
voucher recipients, public housing authorities participating in the Moving to Work (MTW) 
demonstration project are permitted to impose work requirements. Though MTW is called a 
demonstration, it was not designed to be evaluated. 
There are numerous differences between the evaluated pre-1996 experiments and SNAP, 
Medicaid, and housing assistance that affect the applicability of the experiments’ findings to these 
latter programs: 
 Broader populations. SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance programs aid a broader 
population than did AFDC, as most recipients of AFDC were single mothers. In addition 
to general disadvantages such as low levels of education and work experience, single 
mothers faced a specific barrier of needing to find care for their young children. SNAP, 
Medicaid, and housing assistance serve a broader population of low-income individuals, 
such as married couples with and without children, noncustodial parents, and single men 
and women who are not parents. Some in these groups might also have specific barriers 
(e.g., the formerly incarcerated (who are often men) might have difficulty being hired 
because of their criminal record).  
 Working low-income people. AFDC rules required the earnings of those who had them 
to be very low in order to come onto the rolls, and they limited the time that recipients 
with substantial earnings could remain on assistance. Thus, AFDC generally served 
nonworking single parents. SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance serve lower-income 
individuals and families, but their income eligibility thresholds are higher than those for 
cash assistance. Thus, many of these programs serve individuals who are working, albeit 
at relatively low wages and sometimes with irregular and less than full-time work 
schedules.  
 Different goals. The goals of the evaluated pre-1996 experiments involved moving 
nonworking AFDC recipients into work. Programs such as SNAP, housing assistance, and 
Medicaid have some recipients who do not work and are disconnected from the labor 
force, similar to AFDC recipients. However, as noted above, these programs also have 
recipients who are already working. Thus, the goals of work requirements and work 
programs for working recipients would differ from those of the evaluated programs that 
focused on nonworking recipients. For example, a goal might be to increase wage rates or 
number of hours worked, in order to reduce assistance payments or raise incomes so the 
participant no longer qualifies for benefits. Additionally, the Medicaid waivers are being 
granted with the goal of improving the health of the population covered by them, a 
different goal than connecting recipients to work. 
 Different approaches to employment and education services. Among the SNAP, 
housing assistance, and Medicaid programs, only SNAP has a funding mechanism for 
providing employment and educational services to its recipients. Housing and Medicaid 
lack funding for such services. Under the Trump Administration’s “community 
engagement” waiver initiative, Medicaid funds can be used by states to enforce 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the Administration’s Medicaid waiver initiative, see Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access 
Commission, Medicaid Work and Community Engagement Requirements, issue brief, June 2018.  
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compliance with the work and community engagement requirement, but not for 
employment and training services themselves. 
Conclusion 
The welfare reform debates that culminated in the 1996 welfare reform law occurred 
simultaneously with a large number of studies fielded in the 1980s and early 1990s testing work 
requirements and employment and education services for adult recipients of cash assistance for 
needy families (mostly single mothers). The accumulated evidence showed that mandatory 
welfare-to-work programs—the combination of funded employment and education services with 
mandatory participation requirements—could achieve some limited policy goals, increase 
employment, and reduce welfare receipt. It also showed a policy tradeoff. Mandatory welfare-to-
work programs alone did not increase incomes and reduce poverty. However, programs that 
supplemented mandatory participation in a welfare-to-work program with continued aid for 
working parents sometimes increased incomes, though at a cost to the government. 
As Congress debates work requirements in SNAP, Medicaid, and housing assistance, there is no 
large accumulated research base to draw from. Given the differences in populations, presence of 
those in the programs who are already working, goals, and funding structures for employment and 
education services, the findings of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments cannot be directly 
applied to the current debate.  
The lack of a research base on the effectiveness of work requirements for SNAP recipients led to 
Congress requiring pilot work programs in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79). That law authorized 
pilots in 10 states. In March 2015, the U.S. Department of Agriculture awarded grants to 
California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington. These pilots were fully operational beginning in FY2017. The pilots will be 
evaluated using the RCT method, but research findings are not yet available. 21 Congress has 
proceeded with a 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2) without these results.  
In tying work requirements to benefit programs, Congress might consider what goals can be 
achieved by such requirements, welfare-to-work programs, and/or broader labor market policies. 
A key finding of the pre-1996 welfare-to-work experiments was that it was work requirements 
and employment and education services combined with earnings supplements that both raised 
rates of employment and improved the economic outcomes of single mothers with children. 
Today, most earnings supplements are provided through the federal income tax code—the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the partially refundable child tax credit. Most of the benefits of the 
EITC and all of the benefits of the child tax credit go to families with children.22 Individuals and 
families without children, populations that are part of the focus of work requirements for SNAP, 
Medicaid, and housing assistance recipients, qualify for only a small EITC.  
Other labor market policies could also be considered.23 Over time, wages have increased at the 
top of the income distribution but have stagnated for those at the bottom, and they have fallen for 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Evaluation of SNAP Employment and Training Pilots: Fiscal Year 2017 Annual 
Report to Congress. 
22 See CRS Report R43805, The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC): An Overview. 
23 Such as policies that govern wages (collective bargaining, minimum wages), benefits, and employment protections. 
For a comparative discussion of labor market institutions and policies and how they affect lower-wage workers, see 
Low Wage Work in the Wealthy World, ed. Jerome Gautie and John Schmitt (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2010). 
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those with less educational attainment.24 Absent earnings supplements or other labor market 
policies, the stagnant or declining fortunes for a large share of the workforce will likely constrain 
the effectiveness of welfare-to-work initiatives in producing long-term impacts to improve 
employment and economic well-being of program participants. 
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